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Virginia Medicaid Fraud Control Unit Receives “Honest Abe” Award at Fourteenth Annual TAF Conference

By Zachary Kitts on September 19, 2014 in False Claims Act Practice in Virginia, Office of the Attorney General of Virginia, Potential Uses of the Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act

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 Update from the Fourteenth Annual Taxpayers Against Fraud Conference: Virginia Medicaid Fraud Control Unit Receives a Well-Deserved Award and Attorney General Mark Herring Announces a Major Intervention

The Fourteenth Annual Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund Conference was this week, and as usual, it was a great event.  I have been a regular at this conference since 2007, and every year seems to get better than the last.  However, this year was one of special significance for the Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act, and I am proud to say that the Commonwealth was in the spotlight twice.

Virginia MFCU awarded TAF Honest Abe Award

First, I was honored to present the 2014 “Honest Abe” award for good government to the Virginia Medicaid Fraud Control Unit.  And I meant what I said there — we are used to hearing government at all levels point to a lack of resources to justify inactivity, and when government entities refer to “resources” what they mean is money.

There is, however, a far more important resource in government affairs than money, and it is leadership.  The Virginia Medicaid Fraud Control Unit has it, and the proof is in the results that the consistently obtain.

The second major event came on the final day of the Conference.  As regular readers of this blog know — and as referenced above by the Virginia MFCU receiving the Honest Abe award — Virginia has a top-notch enforcement unit for health care cases under the Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act.

What has lagged, however, is enforcement of non-health care VFATA cases.  Indeed, although I have handled — and will continue to handle — health care cases, most of my successes in this area of law have been non-health care cases, and generating interest in the non-health care side of things was one of my primary goals when I started this blog in 2008.

So, I was especially pleased to see, on the final day of the conference, the press release by Virginia Attorney General Mark Herring announcing his intervention in a non-healthcare qui tam case against various banks for defrauding Virginia Retirement Services….hmmm, sounds vaguely familiar — does it not?

The case is captioned Virginia ex rel Integra Rec LLC v. Barclays Capital et al. and it was initiated by a relator on January 24, 2014 in the Circuit Court for the City of Richmond.

Despite the similarities to my FX Analytics case, I do not represent the relator in this one, and I actually don’t know who does, but I am happy to see that more lawyers are taking an interest in these types of cases, and that can only be good for the Commonwealth of Virginia and for the taxpayer.

I knew on the first day of the conference that something was afoot — General Herring was originally supposed to attend the TAF Conference, but had to cancel at the last minute, which is a sure sign of something….

I am certain that we will see more good news from the Virginia MFCU in the not-too-distant-future — and I am hoping that we will see more good news from the Integra Rec case….only time will tell.

 

K&G Law Group is a boutique-style law firm based in Nothern Virginia and practicing nationwide

 

 

 

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State qui tam laws enable states to recover money merely by having a qualifying state false claims law

By Zachary Kitts on August 25, 2014 in state and federal false claims act legislation, State False Claims Act News

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State qui tam laws enable states to recover money merely by having a qualifying state false claims law

Today’s post is the first of a two-parter that takes a look at the inner-workings of a multi-state qui tam case and, specifically, at a recent opinion from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The Court’s opinion in UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex rel. DONALD R. GALMINES, et al. v. NOVARTIS PHARMACEUTICALS CORPORATION concerns an important procedural issue that can arise in multi-state actions and that, in turn, triggers a look at the state false claims act statutes passed by the several states.

But first we begin, as usual, with some background.

The Importance of Multi-state qui tam actions

As regular readers know, in the qui tam/false claims act world, much of the action today is in the health care context. The United States spends more money today on health care claims than it has ever spent, on anything, in the history of the United States.  Actually, never mind the total amounts spent on health care — the New York Times estimated last week that $60 billion dollars is lost to false and/or fraudulent health care claims every year.

And lest anyone think that there is an easy solution, consider this — roughly 4.5 billion Medicare claims are adjudicated daily.  That is 22.5 billion claims for payment each week.

Long story short, there is no solution to the problem of fraud on government health care programs. The very best we can do is to devise ways to contain the fraud and false claims.  And hands down, the single best method to contain fraud and false claims on government health care programs is the federal false claims act. In that regard, the federal government has experienced unqualified success with the federal False Claims Act since the law was originally passed in 1863 and substantially revised in 1986.

But paying for health care is not the exclusive domain of the federal government.  Each one of the 50 states administers some form of the Medicaid program, which provides health care to people who can’t afford it on their own – and the federal government picks up at least 50% of the tab for each state.  So, with a large chunk of every state government’s health care budget coming from the feds, Congress determined that it would be a good idea to have each and every state pass a state false claims act.  Under our system of laws, however, the federal government cannot require any state to pass a specific law. For this reason Section 1909 of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 creates a financial incentive for states to enact false claims legislation.

Not just any old false claims act will suffice — and Congress understood, perhaps based on its own experience, that the legislative process is inherently unpredictable, and it differs from state to state in its level of unpredictability. The very best states have a legislative process that is messy and disorderly, and some states have a legislative process that is full-on dysfunctional. So, for a State to qualify for this monetary incentive, the State law must meet certain requirements listed in section 1909 of the Act.  DHHS-OIG has also published a memo to provide guidance to the states.

There are many reasons why it is a good idea for a state to have a state false claims act modeled on the federal False Claims Act, but chief among them is this – by requiring each state to have a false claims statute that meets certain standards, multi-state qui tam actions are facilitated.  A qui tam relator is able to file his or her case in a U.S. District Court making claims for violations of the federal false claims act, and then include pendent state claims for each state in which a violation occurred.

Stay tuned for part two of this two-part post, which focuses on the opinion from the E.D. Pa….

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When can a qui tam whistleblower share in an alternate remedy?

By Zachary Kitts on August 8, 2014 in False Claims Act Litigation Strategies, How to be a successful qui tam whistleblower

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When can a qui tam whistleblower share in an alternate remedy?

Today’s post is another in our on-going series concerning the requirements for being a successful qui tam relator.  More specifically, it looks at the requirements for claiming a share of the government’s recovery under the alternate remedy provisions found in 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(5) as discussed in a recent Fifth Circuit opinion.

The Court’s opinion in US ex rel. Babalola v. Sharma, et al. is an important reminder to any and all potential qui tam relators out there.  The simple fact is that there are an exacting set of requirements that a potential relator must meet in order to be successful, and most of them are non-negotiable.

But first, a bit of background on alternate remedies and why this concept is so important to qui tam relators and the lawyers that represent them.

What is, and is not, an alternate remedy in qui tam litigation

The alternate remedies provision in the federal False Claims Act provides that if a relator files a qui tam case and the government elects to pursue its claims against the defendant in a manner other than intervening in the qui tam case, the relator is entitled to share in any monetary recovery obtained by the government through the alternate remedy.

It certainly sounds simple enough. Because qui tam relators are required to share all of the information they have with the government — for example, relators are required to serve a disclosure memorandum on the state prior to filing the case, and are then required to file the case under seal of the Court and serve the sealed complaint on the government, but not on the defendant –the government will have an enormous amount of information in its possession about the case.

And in most contexts, the government will have some method of addressing the fraud other than intervening in the qui tam action.  Such recoveries can take many other forms, including but not limited to criminal penalties and fines, debarment proceedings, imposing administrative fines, withholding payment due to the contractor, and so forth.  If a government agency were allowed to study closely all of the relator’s allegations and evidence, and then proceed with a case against the same defendants without sharing the recovery with the relator, government agencies might be tempted to never cooperate with a relator.

This would for the obvious reasons discourage relators from filing cases in the first place, which would not be in the public interest.

Broadly speaking then, an “alternate remedy” is the government’s exercise of an alternate method to deal with a relator’s qui tam case other than intervening in the relator’s case.  Given that the alternate remedies provision is designed to protect the interests of qui tam relators directly and the interests of the government indirectly, it needs to be said that the scarcity of case law interpreting this provision of the federal FCA is a true testament to the community of interests that has arisen between United States Department of Justice lawyers and lawyers in private practice representing qui tam relators. One example is U.S. ex rel. Bledsoe v. Community Health Systems, Inc. 342 F.3d 634, 647 (C.A.6, 2003) but such cases are few and far between, largely because the federal government knows and understands that it is in everyone’s interests not to try using an alternate remedy to cut out a relator.
With that background, we now proceed to examine the recent Fifth Circuit opinion in US ex rel. Babalola v. Sharma.

A look at U.S. ex rel. Babalola v. Sharma

This case was initiated by two relators, Dr. Babalola and Dr. Adetunmbi, who were employed by the defendants, Arun Sharma and Kiran Sharma, from 2007 to 2009. During their employment, relators witnessed tens of millions of dollars in fraudulent healthcare claims by their employers, and resolved to do something about it.  What they did, however, was to complain directly to the government in the form of a detailed – and anonymous — letter sent to various government agencies.

Normally, such letters from anonymous sources are more or less ignored, but every now and again the system actually works and – surprise! – the government conducted an extensive investigation into the allegations of the letter.

To make a long story short, on April 26, 2010, the Sharmas both pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit healthcare and mail fraud and one substantive count of health care fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1347. In February 2011, at their sentencing, the district court ordered the Sharmas to pay over $43 million in restitution to Medicare, Medicaid, and certain private insurers.  Despite their early interest in their employer’s fraudulent practices, Dr. Babalola and Dr. Adetunmbi did not file a qui tam Complaint under the federal FCA and the Texas Medicaid Fraud statute until November, 2011. In other words, after investigation, the indictment, and the criminal sentencing was a done deal.
That is not to say that relators dropped off the map or were not helpful to the government during its investigation. To the contrary, relators met with government officials several times during the investigation and provided input and various kinds of assistance to the government.

Proceedings before the U.S. District Court

As mentioned above, the relators didn’t file their qui tam complaint until the criminal sentencing and restitution were in the bag.  What happened next is important – the government simply announced its non-intervention in the qui tam case and asked that the Court unseal the Complaint.  This is important because the alternate remedy provision only applies when the government pursues an alternate remedy that precludes the relator from pursuing his or her claims.

In other words, had the government filed a motion seeking to dismiss the case because it had already prosecuted it, the relators would have been in luck. But that is not what the government did.

The next move by relators counsel was to move the court to compel depositions of certain department of justice officials, as if this were a relator’s share dispute. In response, DOJ moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that relators were not entitled to any share whatsoever.

The Babalola case provides clear guidance for qui tam whistleblowers and their counsel everywhere

Besides the above-referenced reason – i.e., the government’s proceeding with the criminal indictment did not preclude the relators from proceeding with their qui tam case – there is an additional, more important, reason why the relators in this case were unsuccessful.

The reason is simply this – the alternate remedies provision of the FCA applies only when there is a pending qui tam case and DOJ determines whether it will pursue the same sorts of claims made in the qui tam Complaint via something other than intervening in the qui tam case filed by the relator.

Notice also that we are well outside the bounds of the “original source” analysis here.  Meaning, it does not matter if a relator is the original source of the information that leads to the criminal indictment or not.
As it turns out, I think the Court reached the right opinion in this case. We don’t need to go so far as the law for that – to me, it doesn’t feel right that a relator would be able to send an anonymous letter to the government, and then watch comfortably from the sidelines until the fight is over…

K&G Law Group PLLC

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House Judiciary Hearings on Federal False Claims Act

By Zachary Kitts on July 31, 2014 in federal False Claims Act, state and federal false claims act legislation

 

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 Breaking News:  House Judiciary Hearings on Federal False Claims Act

Regular readers are accustomed to hearing about state by state legislative battles over false claims act legislation, but today we have some news from the United States Congress itself.

Specifically, the House of Representatives Judiciary Committee heard testimony on the federal False Claims Act yesterday.  This was the first opposition hearing on the federal False Claims Act in 20 years and the first hearing of any kind in six years.

And, I am pleased to report, we came away with a significant win.  Sen. Charles Grassley (R-IA) testified on behalf of the federal FCA, as did Judge John Clark.

House Committee Hearing

Link to a recording of yesterday’s testimony

Bear in mind, this was not a legislative hearing per se in that no new      amendments were or are proposed to the federal false claims act. Rather, this  hearing was to review the effectiveness of the law.

Among many other highlights, Senator Grassley (who of course is known for plain speaking and calling it like he sees it) said the Chamber of Commerce (who of course has fought the federal False Claims Act and state false claims acts at every opportunity) ” represents the biggest fraudsters in America” and had “an entirely fictional plan to fight fraud.”

The Chamber’s expert on corporate compliance programs (whose organization is, of course, funded by the Chamber itself as well as a number of pharmaceutical companies) said compliance programs cannot help if a company does not have, and is not committed to, a culture of integrity and ethical behavior.

David Ogden carried the water for the Chamber of Commerce…and when asked to name a compliance program that worked and was a model of success, he could offer up no examples of success…not a one.

No big surprise there of course…it seems our friends at the Chamber of Commerce do not fare any better at the federal level than they do at the state level…

K&G Law Group PLLC

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Maryland False Claims Act Referendum, Part Two

By Zachary Kitts on July 12, 2014 in State False Claims Act News

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Maryland False Claims Act Referendum, Part Two

This is the second of a two-part post on the mini-referendum that took place on the Maryland False Claims Act recently.

In the 2014 legislative session, Brinkley prevented passage of the Maryland False Claims Act of 2014 by using a procedural maneuver to avoid a vote before the full Maryland Senate, where it would have certainly passed.  His opponent in this primary — a current member of the Maryland House of Delegates named Michael Hough — had supported the Maryland FCA of 2014 in the House of Delegates.

At the conclusion of the first post, I left off by saying that it seemed to me that now-former state Sen. Brinkley was digging his own grave when he decided to make the Maryland FCA a center-piece of his campaign strategy.  I say this because FCA legislation is common-sense stuff that has proved wildly popular with Republicans and Democrats, not to mention their constituents.  And lets not forget the federal False Claims Act was amended in the late-1980s in response to wide-spread public outrage over $600 toilet seats and $3,000 coffee makers.  So the first sign that Brinkley was in trouble was the fact that he was not running from his anti-FCA agenda but appeared to be running on his anti-FCA agenda.

But when Brinkley started trotting out the think-tanker wing of the Republican party in an effort to connect with Republican voters, it was pretty clear to me that he was in finished.  Specifically, Brinkley made an op-ed piece by a Cato Institute think-tanker named Walter Olson a centerpiece of his campaign strategy.  Long story short, Brinkley lost.  Badly.

But today, I want to take a look at Walter Olson’s anti-FCA op-ed in the Baltimore Business Journal entitled “Anti-fraud legislation in Maryland could have unintended side effects.”

A Look At Olson’s main argument — if false claims act laws are so “controversial” why do all of the most business-friendly states have them?

There are in fact no real arguments in Olson’s piece, so we will take a look at the half-truth around which his article is based.  I am talking about his reference to the false claims act laws as “controversial.”  I call this a half-truth because strictly speaking it is true if he is talking only about Maryland which has struggled every year since 2010 to pass a simple piece of legislation that will return millions of dollars to its public fisc.

But if we look at the national picture, we see that that FCA legislation is quite uncontroversial on the federal and state levels nearly everywhere else, and it enjoys broad bipartisan support. It was masterminded by the likes of Sen. Charles Grassley (R-IA) and signed into law by President Ronald Reagan. Perhaps most important for our topic here, we would not be having this conversation at all had President George W. Bush not signed the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005.  That is because the DRA of 2005 created important (and considerable) financial incentives for states to pass state-level false claims laws that match the federal false claims act.

False claims legislation may be controversial in Maryland, but it should be left to the reader whether that says more about Maryland than it does about false claims legislation.  A list of states where such laws have not been controversial, by the way, reads just like a list of business-friendly states, and legislators in states like Virginia, Texas, Florida, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Delaware (to name just a few) had little or no trouble passing a law that would put millions of dollars more into their budget.

I have traveled to Annapolis to testify in favor of false claims legislation every year since 2010 when the O’Malley administration made it a priority.  And every year, I have asked those legislators and lobbyists opposed to FCA laws to respond to one simple question – if false claims laws are such a bad idea, why do all of the most business-friendly states have them?  I am still waiting for an answer.

If, on the other hand, we turn this analysis on its head and look at a list of states that, like Maryland, have struggled with this basic legislation year after year, we see that Maryland find herself in a curious group, and one to which she surely does not belong.  Her companions would be states like Ohio and West Virginia – in other words, states plagued by chronic dysfunction, corruption and mismanagement at every level.

In any event, I hope this example of the mini-referendum that took place on false claims act legislation will catch the attention of other legislators in other places who might be tempted to listen to the messages of anti-FCA advocates like the Chamber of Commerce and various think-tankers….

And congratulations once against to Del. Michael Hough — soon to be Sen. Michael Hough!

K&G Law Group PLLC

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The mini-referendum on the Maryland False Claims Act in Legislative District 4

By Zachary Kitts on July 5, 2014 in State False Claims Act News, Uncategorized

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The mini-referendum on the Maryland False Claims Act in Legislative District 4 — Part 1 of 2

Today is the first of a two-part post revisiting a frequent topic here at Vaquitamlaw.com – the Maryland False Claims Act and, more specifically, the battle that has raged for the last four years in Maryland over this legislation.

Regular readers of this blog have followed past events in Maryland, but last month, this on-going fight took an interesting — and novel — turn.  Until June of 2014, the Maryland FCA battle was fought in legislative Committees of the House of Delegates and the state Senate, but this summer the fight spilled over into a Republican primary in Senate District 4.  And, because the two men running in this district primary each played major roles in the 2014 fight – with one guy being pro-Maryland FCA and the other guy being anti-FCA — the primary race became a mini-referendum on the Maryland False Claims Act.

And the good guys – or rather, the good guy, in the form of Del. Michael Hough – won.

The mini-referendum on the Maryland False Claims Act in Legislative District 4

Here’s what happened.  In the 2014 legislative session we came closer than ever before to passing a real Maryland False Claims Act.  Only one hurdle stood in the way – a committee of the Maryland state Senate.  As a result of Del. Sam Arora’s tireless efforts, supporters of the Maryland FCA had enough votes to pass the bill in a full Senate vote, and it looked like that was exactly what was going to happen.  Then, on the last day of the 2014 legislative session, Republican state Sen. David Brinkley used what is politely called a “procedural maneuver” to kill the Maryland False Claims Act of 2014 in committee so that it never reached a full vote on the Senate floor.

Had Brinkley not subverted the democratic process by killing an important piece of legislation that had already passed the House of Delegates for the umpteenth time, the law would have passed the full Senate and, since it had already been passed by the House of Delegates, it would have landed on Gov. O’Malley’s desk, where it would have certainly been signed.

Those of us who have spent a great deal of time and effort on the Maryland FCA were, to say the least, irked by Sen. Brinkley’s end-run around the bill.  Among the individuals upset by this was one Maryland Republican Del. Michael Hough, who had done the proper and brave thing and voted in favor of the Maryland FCA of 2014.

So, when Hough (which is pronounced “Huff”) announced that he was challenging Brinkley in the state Senate primary, it was a pretty safe bet that the Maryland FCA would become an issue.

The voters of Legislative District 4 Get to Vote on the Maryland False Claims Act

Throughout the primary, Brinkley kept swinging – spurred on, no doubt, by the Chamber of Commerce and the “think-tanker” wing of the Republican Party – by trying to turn Del. Hough’s support of the Maryland False Claims Act into a political liability.

This, it turns out, was a serious miscalculation by Brinkley, but that should hardly be surprising.  It has always seemed to me that when a sitting incumbent is challenged in a primary it is always, at least in part, because the electorate feels the incumbent has gotten out of touch and no longer understands them.   As part of that, the electorate very often feels that the incumbent spends too much time listening to lobbyists and think-tankers and not enough time listening to constituents.

And there is a fair amount of evidence that that is what happened here.  For example, Brinkley trotted out nothing less than a bona fide inside-the-beltway think-tanker in the form of Walter Olson of the Cato Institute.  Olson published an oped piece in the Baltimore Business Journal entitled “Anti-fraud legislation in Maryland could have unintended side effects.”

I will deal with Olson’s piece — which is long on long on emotion and short on fact — in the next part of this post, but in closing I will just say this:  I don’t know how long Brinkley represented the 4th legislative district, but he was obviously out of touch if the best he can do to reach the voters of Frederick County Maryland is to bring in a think-tanker like Walter Olson.

Stay tuned for Part 2 of 2 on Maryland’s mini-referendum on the FCA.

K&G Law Group PLLC

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HUBzone certifications and federal false claims act violations

By Zachary Kitts on July 2, 2014 in federal False Claims Act litigation, Virginia Whistleblowers

Virginia Qui Tam Law.com -- The first blog dedicated to the Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act and to Qui Tam Litigation in Virginia

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Today we will take a look at HUBzone certifications and federal false claims act violations — that is to say, fraud and false claims against the Historically Underutilized Business Zones Empowerment Contracting Program, more commonly known as the HUBzone program.

The HUBzone program – created by the Small Business Reauthorization Act of 1997 and administered by the United States Small Business Administration – aims to stimulate economic growth in certain areas of the country.  The program is no doubt worthwhile, and has done much good in the last 17 years. The basic requirements and goals of the HUBzone program are set-forth in 13 C.F.R. §126.100.

As regular readers know, to find the false claims in government procurement, you just need to follow the money. Wherever and whenever the government commits large amounts of money to a specific goal, fraudfeasors are sure to follow. By that measure, the HUBzone program is indeed a most tempting target because the federal government has set a goal of awarding 3% of all dollars for federal prime contracts to HUBZone-certified small business concerns.  In order to qualify for a piece of this lucrative HUBzone action, a business must be certified by the SBA as meeting all of the following criteria:

(1) the business must be a small business by SBA standards;

(2) it must be owned and controlled at least 51% by U.S. citizens, or a Community Development Corporation, an agricultural cooperative, or an Indian tribe;

(3) the principal office of the business must be located within a “Historically Underutilized Business Zone; and,

(4) at least 35% of its employees must reside in a HUBZone.

Parenthetically, a number of counties in Virginia qualify as HUBzone locations.  These locations are, as indicated in the map below, mostly in Southwest Virginia and Southside Virginia with a smattering in Northern Neck and even a bit up next to the West Virginia line, but I digress.

Virginia HUBzone map

 

Once a business is certified as a HUBzone business, it must be re-certified every three years. In addition, a HUBzone business is required by law to report any “material change” to its HUBzone status. A “material  change” includes, but is not limited to: changes in the ownership, Changes in business structure, changes in principal office and failure to meet the 35% HUBZone residency requirement.
So what happens if a business plays fast and loose with these requirements?

You guessed it readers – if, at any time after becoming certified, a certified entity fails to maintain its eligibility for HUBZone certification, such entity and its principals are required to “immediately notify the SBA” of its lack of eligibility (See 13 C.F.R. §126.501). Stated another way, there is an affirmative obligation on the part of any certified HUBzone small business to notify the SBA if they suddenly, for whatever reason, become ineligible to participate in HUBzone contracts.

The penalties for failure to comply with such requirement explicitly include, among other things, liability under the federal False Claims Act. See 13 C.F.R. § 126.900(b).
And, in addition to the obvious false claims and fraud arising from the original certification process (or, after initial certification, a failure to immeditately notify the SBA of any changes) there are numerous other ways businesses can run afoul of the law. In order for such a violation to rise to the level of a false claims act violation, it would be necessary for the businesses actions to be taken “knowingly.”

 

K&G Law Group is a boutique-style law firm based in Nothern Virginia and practicing nationwide

 

 

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Attorney fee awards after McAfee v. Boczar

By Zachary Kitts on June 7, 2014 in False Claims Act Litigation Strategies, federal False Claims Act litigation, Mandatory Fee Shifting Clauses in Litigation

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Attorney Fee Awards After McAfee v. Boczar in the Fourth Circuit

Today we will take a look at attorney fee awards after McAfee v. Boczar and the important guidance this opinion provides for Courts awarding attorney’s fees.  Although the McAfee opinion represents only a slight clarification of the law, in my view it is an important one for reasons that go straight to the heart of our system of laws and jurisprudence.  But first, a few basics.

The Twelve Factor “Johnson Test” in the Fourth Circuit

To begin at the beginning, when a statute or contract provides that a prevailing party is entitled to recover its reasonable attorney’s fees, federal courts more or less without exception utilize the lodestar method. The lodestar method consists of determining a reasonable hourly rate for the services of the lawyers and determining whether the hours sought are reasonable. Once those two elements are in place, the court simply multiplies the reasonable rate by the hours reasonably expended.

Once a petitioner has made this prima facie showing of reasonable hourly rates and a reasonable number of hours worked, any adjustment upward or downward must be based on objective criteria and tied to specific evidence.
Of course, a great deal of ink has been spilled hashing out the specifics of this two-pronged test, and there is a great deal of guidance for courts faced with an attorney’s fee petition. For almost 40 years (since Barber v. Kimbrell’s Inc., 577 F. 2d 216, 226-28 (4th Cir. 1978)) Courts in the Fourth Circuit have applied the factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F. 2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974) when determining whether a petitioner has met his or her burden.

Most of the twelve Johnson factors are intuitive enough in my opinion. In no specific order, they are: (1) time and labor required; (2) novelty and difficulty of the questions in the case; (3) skill required for the legal work; (4) whether the lawyers were precluded from other work; (5) the fee customary for similar legal work; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingency; (7) experience, reputation and skill of the lawyers; (8) limitations on time imposed by the case; (9) amount involved and the result obtained; (10) awards in similar cases; (11) the desirability or undesirability of the case; (12) the nature and length of the lawyer’s relationship with the client.
As regular readers know, I have an interest in this particular area of law.  In addition to litigating my own attorney’s fee petitions, I am often asked to serve as an expert witness for other lawyers’ fee petitions, in attorney’s fee disputes, legal malpractice claims, and other types of claims, and every time I wound up thinking that a few of the Johnson factors were somewhat mystifying.  For example, in my fee petitions I am never quite sure what I am supposed to say in analyzing factor number 6 (whether the fee is fixed or contingency) or how that should or could figure into the Court’s lodestar analysis.  Nor was I ever certain how factor number 12 (the nature and length of the lawyer’s relationship with the client) or factor 11 (the desirability or undesirability of the case) play a role in determining a reasonable hourly rate or a reasonable number of hours.

So I welcomed the recent clarification issued by the Fourth Circuit in McAfee v. Boczar, 738 F.3d 81 (4th Cir. 2013). The McAfee opinion provides at least one important clarification of the law; specifically, the Court emphasized that factor 9 – the amount at issue in the case and the amount of the relief obtained – is not relevant to an attorney’s fee award when considered alone; rather, what is relevant is the amount of the relief obtained in comparison with the amount of the relief sought. McAfee, 738 F.3d at 92-93.
And, I submit, the view that would be contrary to this would by necessity posit that Courts and lawyers deem certain cases “worthy” or “unworthy” based on something other than what the plain letter of the law provides…and that is about as antithetical to the notice of equal justice under the law as anything I can think of.

K&G Law Group is a boutique-style law firm based in Nothern Virginia and practicing nationwide

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Pretrial Motions Practice in Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act cases

By Zachary Kitts on May 30, 2014 in False Claims Act Litigation Strategies, False Claims Act Trial Strategy, Uncategorized

Virginia Qui Tam Law.com -- The first blog dedicated to the Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act and to Qui Tam Litigation in Virginia

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Pretrial Motions Practice in Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act cases

Today’s post takes a look at pretrial motions practice in Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act cases.  Specifically, we will take a look at a specific motion in limine that will need to be filed in almost every VFATA case — a motion to preclude the defendants from informing the jury about the treble damages provision of the statute (or, if the case is a stand-alone anti-retaliation case, the double damages provision).

Needless to say, a lawyer should consult with opposing counsel prior to filing the motion.  This is exactly the sort of thing that can — and should — be done by way of a consent order, but that depends to a large degree on the quality of the lawyering being done on the other side.  Some lawyers will demand to see a published opinion for anything and everything before they will accept it as a principle of law.  In that regard, a person is bound to be disappointed, because there is no published opinion, to my knowledge, confirming that a jury should not be informed that a plaintiff will receive treble damages in a federal False Claims Act case or in a Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act case.

Instead, it is necessary to look at (1) the function of a jury in civil litigation, (2) the rules of evidence and (3) case law from other statutes with similar liquidated damages provisions.

The function of a jury in civil litigation

A jury’s function in a VFATA case is to determine liability and, if the defendant is liable, to calculate the damages in a case.  This is a distinct and different issue than the actual judgment ultimately awarded to a plaintiff.  Determining the amount of the actual judgment is work for the Court and, by way of the legislation, the Virginia General Assembly.  The Virginia General Assembly’s purpose in doubling the damages award under the Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act was (obviously) to ensure that plaintiffs recover twice the amount they have lost.  If a jury were to be told about the double damages provision, it might adjust the amount of the judgment downward, thereby thwarting the legislature’s intent.

The rules of evidence prohibit the use of irrelevant or prejudicial evidence

Under Virginia Rule of Evidence 2:401, only relevant evidence may be presented to a jury; pursuant to Rule 2:402, irrelevant evidence may not be presented to a jury. “Relevant evidence” means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact in issue more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.  Without question, the fact that the Virginia General Assembly created a liquidated damages provision (whether we are talking about double damages for wrongful termination or treble damages under the VFATA’s main provisions) is not relevant because it does not pertain even remotely to whether the defendant broke the law or, if so, the amount of the plaintiff’s damages, and such evidence is therefore irrelevant.

Even worse, evidence of a liquidated damages provision may even be prejudicial to the plaintiff.  The Virginia Rules of Evidence provide that even relevant evidence “may be excluded if … the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by … the danger of unfair prejudice, or … its likelihood of confusing or misleading the trier of fact ….” Va. Sup. Ct. R. 2:403.

Finally, case law interpreting similar statutes makes it clear that a jury is not to be informed about the presence of a liquidated damages provision in a statute

While there may not be a case exactly on point from false claims act litigation, this exact issue has been extensively discussed in the context of antitrust suits brought under the Clayton Act.  (15 U.S.C.A. § 12 et seq.) Under the Clayton Act, plaintiffs are entitled to treble damages. Courts have consistently held that the jury should not be informed of this treble damages provision. The courts’ reasoning is that “[t]he justifiable fear of plaintiffs is that the juries will adjust the damage award downward or find no liability, therefore thwarting Congress’s purpose, because of some notions of a windfall to the plaintiff. One court has even suggested that a jury might take the revelation of the treble damage provision as an intimation from the court to restrict the amount of damages.” Pollock & Riley, Inc. v. Pearl Brewing Co., 498 F.2d 1240, 1243 (5th Cir. 1974).

Conclusion

In many different types of civil litigation, pretrial motions in limine are an important part of the trial strategy, but this is especially true in VFATA cases or in other types of cases with a liquidated damages provision.  The plaintiff should ask the Court to enter an Order estopping the defense from making any reference at any time during the trial, during argument, or in the jury instructions, as to the double damages (or treble damages) provisions of the statute.

K&G Law Group is a boutique-style law firm based in Nothern Virginia and practicing nationwide

 

 

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Qui Tam Complaints shall be filed in camera and placed under seal

By Zachary Kitts on May 3, 2014 in False Claims Act Practice in Virginia, federal False Claims Act litigation

Virginia Qui Tam Law.com -- The first blog dedicated to the Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act and to Qui Tam Litigation in Virginia

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Qui Tam Complaints shall be filed in camera and placed under seal

I have received questions from several readers over the past year or so about the seal requirements of the federal False Claims Act and, more specifically, what is required by the seal provisions found in 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2).  Several readers have informed me that some U.S. District Court Case Managers believe that qui tam cases filed under the federal FCA are automatically placed under seal by virtue of the language of the statute, and that no motion to seal or proposed order sealing the case until further notice is needed.

This exchange usually happens when a lawyer files a new qui tam action in a U.S. District Court.  The unique procedural requirements of the law require that several other items be filed along with the Complaint.  First, the lawyer also needs to file a Motion to Withhold Issue of Summons, and second, the lawyer needs to a Motion to File In Camera and Place Under Seal (or at least, that is what I call my motions) together with a draft Order to be entered by the Court.

Talk about a sticky wicket — generally speaking, I am of the opinion that wise lawyers treat Case Managers, Court Room Deputies, and other court officials with the exact same respect that would be shown to a Judge.  The administrative staff of a Court knows a great deal about how the Court works.  They are certainly worth listening to, and they are usually willing to share their knowledge freely.  So what is a wise lawyer to do when a Case Manager says that a Motion to File Under Seal isn’t needed, because that particular Court simply files qui tam Complaints under seal automatically?

If a Case Manager takes this position, it is not as off-base as one might think initially.

Back to the basics — the language of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2)

31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) provides that when filing a qui tam Complaint:

The complaint shall be filed in camera, shall remain under seal for at least 60 days, and shall not be served on the defendant until the court so orders. The Government may elect to intervene and proceed with the action within 60 days after it receives both the complaint and the material evidence and information.

So, the language of the statute itself does not mention a Court Order.  But, I am of the firm opinion that a Seal Order is a vital element to be filed with the Court, and I think there is plenty of support for that idea in the above-language.  Here is why:  first, to file something with a Court in camera means, according to every legal dictionary, to file it in a non-public manner for a Judge — and only a Judge — to review.  Certainly the Judge as this stage of the proceedings is not required by law to read the Complaint; I therefore think that the need for a seal order is implied by virtue of a second principle, which is that Courts speak through their Orders.

So as to how I would handle this situation (i.e., the situation where a Case Manager says a seal order isn’t necessary) I would suggest politely asking them to humor you and submit the Order to the Judge anyhow…

K&G Law Group is a boutique-style law firm based in Nothern Virginia and practicing nationwide

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Virginia Qui Tam Law.com is the first blog dedicated to the Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act and to false claims act litigation in Virginia.